Comments on: apocalyptic horsemen add friends http://knackeredhack.com/2009/02/02/apocalyptic-horsemen-add-friends/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=apocalyptic-horsemen-add-friends the curious study of broken things Tue, 24 Jan 2012 10:24:38 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 By: knackeredhack http://knackeredhack.com/2009/02/02/apocalyptic-horsemen-add-friends/comment-page-1/#comment-84930 knackeredhack Fri, 24 Apr 2009 12:03:34 +0000 http://knackeredhack.com/2009/02/02/apocalyptic-horsemen-add-friends/#comment-84930 Ken, I'm sure that securitization is fundamentally a good thing and that it is the governance and risk management cultures that went wrong. I'm reading Shiller's new book Animal Spirits, which has a lot to say about how collective judgement went awry. Tim Ken,

I’m sure that securitization is fundamentally a good thing and that it is the governance and risk management cultures that went wrong. I’m reading Shiller’s new book Animal Spirits, which has a lot to say about how collective judgement went awry.

Tim

]]> By: Ken Smith http://knackeredhack.com/2009/02/02/apocalyptic-horsemen-add-friends/comment-page-1/#comment-74658 Ken Smith Sun, 29 Mar 2009 00:22:44 +0000 http://knackeredhack.com/2009/02/02/apocalyptic-horsemen-add-friends/#comment-74658 Taleb and Roubini I think speak above the head of most people (myself included). Here, however what they are saying is simply rewarding failure has adverse (perverse?) consequences. Don't reward the guys who broke the financial system. I wonder if the study of broken things requires full account of what broke what? Did the regulatory structure that did not prevent this carnage get broken, or did the banking structure which profits from uncertainty break from overstress, and does the underlying problem of stressing the system as part of delivering profits explain why no laws were broken? They all lent money and securitzed the risk until the illusion of risk free profits came undone. Was securitization the fix that broke banking? Taleb and Roubini I think speak above the head of most people (myself included). Here, however what they are saying is simply rewarding failure has adverse (perverse?) consequences. Don’t reward the guys who broke the financial system. I wonder if the study of broken things requires full account of what broke what? Did the regulatory structure that did not prevent this carnage get broken, or did the banking structure which profits from uncertainty break from overstress, and does the underlying problem of stressing the system as part of delivering profits explain why no laws were broken? They all lent money and securitzed the risk until the illusion of risk free profits came undone.
Was securitization the fix that broke banking?

]]>